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The necessity of a better, more detailed under-
standing of knowledge creation processes in the 
knowledge based economy for the needs of today 
and tomorrow resulted recently in the emergence 
of many micro-theories of knowledge creation, as 
opposed to classical concentration of philosophy 
on macro-theories of knowledge creation on a 
long term historical scale. Historically, we could 
count the concept of brainstorming (A.F. Osborn, 
1957) as first of such micro-theories. However, 
since 1990 we observe many such new mi-
cro-theories originating in systems science, 
management science and information science, 
beginning with the Shinayakana Systems Ap-
proach (Y. Nakamori and Y. Sawaragi, 1990), the 
Knowledge Creating Company and the SECI 
Spiral (I. Nonaka and H. Takeuchi, 1995), the 
Rational Theory of Intuition (A.P. Wierzbicki, 
1997), the I5 (Pentagram) System (Y. Nakamori, 
2000), the OPEC Spiral (S. Gasson 2004) and 
several others. This can be counted as a recent 
revolution in knowledge creation theories, be-
cause all of them take explicitly into account the 
interplay of tacit, intuitive, emotive, and prever-
bal aspects with explicit or rational aspects of 
knowledge creation.  
Additional results concerning micro-theories 
of knowledge creation were obtained also in the 
21st Century COE Program Technology Creation 
Based on Knowledge Science at the Japan Ad-
vanced Institute of Science and Technology 
(JAIST). For example, the brainstorming process 
was represented as the DCCV Spiral due to the 
research in this Program. The concept of Creative 
Space (A.P. Wierzbicki and Y. Nakamori, 2006) 
developed in this Program tries to provide a 
synthesis of such diverse micro-theories. The 
concept of the Triple Helix of normal academic 
knowledge creation combines three spirals: the 
Hermeneutic EAIR Spiral of analysing and in-
terpreting scientific literature, the Experimental 
EEIS Spiral of performing experiments and in-
terpreting their results, and the Intersubjective 
EDIS Spiral of debating and discussing research 
results; these three spirals characterize main 
creativity processes at universities and research 
institutions. The idea of Nanatsudaki Model of 
Knowledge Creation Processes (A.P. Wierzbicki 
and Y. Nakamori, 2007a) tries to derive prag-
matic conclusions from such analysis and syn-
thesis, by combining seven spirals (objective 
setting OPEC, hermeneutic EAIR, socializing 
SECI, brainstorming DCCV, debating EDIS, 
roadmapping I-System, and experimenting EEIS) 
in an order useful for organizing large research 
projects. 
Parallel to the development of micro-theories 
of knowledge creation, we can observe the per-
ception of change also in classical philosophy. As 
opposed to Wittgensteinian concentration on 
words and language with its prohibition to speak 
about metaphysics, or to postmodernist and 
poststructuralist belief that world is constructed 
by verbal discourse only, philosophy turns back 
today to metaphysical issues. This trend has al-
ready certain tradition, see L. Kołakowski (1988), 
but intensifies recently, see G. Żurkowska (2006), 
B. Skarga (2007); A. Motycka (1998) proposed 
also a model of knowledge creation during sci-
entific revolutions, based on emotive and 
mythical, thus in a sense metaphysical knowl-
edge. In relation to this trend, it is important to 
realize that at least two results of the 21st Century 
COE Program Technology Creation Based on 
Knowledge Science – namely, the Multimedia 
Principle and the Emergence Principle – might 
have an important impact on new discussions of 
metaphysical issues.  
These two principles were first formulated in 
(Wierzbicki and Nakamori 2006), further elabo-
rated in (Wierzbicki and Nakamori 2007a) as a 
part of a new integrated episteme called Con-
structive Evolutionary Objectivism that we be-
lieve to be needed for the starting era of knowl-
edge civilisation. However, since these two 
principles might have a basic impact on under-
standing of many issues, including such seem-
ingly distant fields as technology formation and 
metaphysical issues, I decided to devote this pa-
per to the examination of their importance. 
We start with recalling these two principles: 
Multimedia principle: words are just an ap-
proximate code to describe a much more complex 
reality, visual and preverbal information in gen-
eral is much more powerful and relates to intui-
tive knowledge and reasoning; the future records 
of the intellectual heritage of humanity will have 
a multimedia character, thus stimulating creativ-
ity. 
Emergence principle: new properties of a 
system emerge with increased levels of com-
plexity, and these properties are qualitatively 
different than and irreducible to the properties of 
its parts. 
Both these principles might seem to be just 
common sense, intuitive perceptions; the point is 
that in (A.P. Wierzbicki and Y. Nakamori, 2006) 
they are justified rationally and scientifically. 
Moreover, they go beyond and are in a sense 
opposed to fashionable trends in poststructural-
ism and the postmodern philosophy or sociology 
of science. 
The Multimedia Principle is based on the 
technological and information science knowl-
edge: the broadband needed for speech (words) is 
only 20 kHz, for vision is at least 2 MHz, thus 
requires 100 times more data. The complexity of 
processing large quantities of data grows strongly 
nonlinearly with the amount of data; taking 
quadratic growth as a lower bound, we obtain the 
conclusion that the difficulty of processing pic-
tures is at least 10 000 more than processing 
words: a figure is worth at least ten thousand 
words. The poststructuralist philosophy stresses 
the roles of metaphors and icons, but reduces 
them to signs; the simplest argument against such 
a reduction is presented in Fig. 1, where the 
temple of Byodoin as an icon (Japanese 10 yen 
coin) and Byodoin as a picture are compared. The 
icon serves only as a metaphor, while we would 
have to use many words to describe the details of 
the picture. 
 
 
Fig. 1. An icon (left) and a picture (right) of Byodoin 
 
 
Thus, the world is not constructed by us in a 
social discourse, as the poststructuralist and 
postmodern philosophy wants us to believe (see, 
e.g., J. Derrida, 1974): we observe the world by 
all our senses, including vision, and strive to find 
adequate words when trying to describe our 
preverbal impressions and thinking to commu-
nicate them in language. Language is a shortcut 
in civilisation evolution of humans, our original 
thinking is preverbal, often unconscious, related 
to intuitive and emotive or jointly tacit knowl-
edge, and this form of thinking is much more 
powerful and creative than verbal, rational 
thinking. For a more full description of the func-
tioning and power, of an evolutionary rational 
theory of intuition, see (Wierzbicki 1997, 2005). 
The only problem is that our preverbal intuition is 
not infallible, as it was postulated by Descartes or 
Kant; it is very much fallible and thus we must 
use verbal, rational reasoning and logics to ini-
tially check our intuitive ideas for their consis-
tency – either internal or with other parts of hu-
man heritage knowledge. Further checking, at 
least in technology, requires empirical testing. 
However, this clear distinction of preverbal 
and verbal thinking and knowledge, and the proof 
that preverbal is much more powerful, implies 
that we should also re-evaluate many assump-
tions in metaphysics. We could thus divide 
metaphysics into three areas: 1) metaphysics of 
the unconscious and preverbal; 2) metaphysics of 
the ultimate and absolute; and, in a sense between 
them, 3) metaphysics of truth. The ontological 
pressure rightly stressed by J. Srzednicki as the 
metaphysical source of knowledge (see, e.g., G. 
Żurkowska, 2006) is the pressure of preverbal 
information about beings surrounding us, and can 
be rationally analysed using multimedia princi-
ple; we only need new words, concepts and 
metaphors when we try to speak rationally about 
preverbal issues. 
On the other hand, since Multimedia Principle 
originates in technology, it has also diverse im-
plications for technology creation. Technologists 
know well and treasure visual ways of presenting 
information; but Multimedia Principle implies 
more. First, it implies that information technol-
ogy creation should concentrate on multimedia 
aspects – including visual, but not limited to 
them - of supporting communication and crea-
tivity. Second, it implies that technology creation 
starts essentially with preverbal thinking, which 
might be one of the reasons of the differences 
between the episteme of technology and that of 
social sciences and humanities. 
Diverse ways of creating knowledge belong to 
the episteme – the prevalent way of creating and 
justifying knowledge, characteristic for a given 
historical era or a cultural sphere. However, the 
episteme of the industrial civilization, called 
sometimes the modern episteme, was subjected 
to a destruction process, particularly visible in the 
last fifty years. This has lead to a divergent de-
velopment of separate episteme of three cultural 
spheres: that of social sciences and humanities 
(diversified internally, with postmodern subjec-
tivism as its most divergent variant), that of hard 
and natural sciences (following mostly paradig-
matism, see T. Kuhn, 1962), and that of tech-
nology (as we shall see, following mostly falsi-
ficationism, see K. Popper, 1972): they use dif-
ferent languages, but more important is the fact 
that they use different fundamental epistemic 
concepts and different ways of constructing and 
justifying knowledge, see (A.P. Wierzbicki 
2004).  
For example, the word technology has many 
meanings: it can mean: 
9 For a post-modern social scien-
tist: an autonomous force enslaving human-
ity; 
9 For an economist: a way of do-
ing things, a technical or technological 
process; 
9 In common language: a technical 
artefact, a product of technology; 
9 For a natural scientist: an appli-
cation of scientific theories; 
9 For a technologist: the art of 
constructing tools, an inherent faculty of 
humanity, motivated by the joy of creation: 
 Liberating people from hard 
work; 
 Helping technology brokers 
(venture capitalists, bankers, managers) to 
make money - and if any effect of that is 
enslaving, the brokers are responsible; 
 Stimulating the development of 
hard science by inventions which give it new 
principles to develop new concepts. 
 
If we take the definition of technology from 
the most competent stakeholders – the technolo-
gists themselves – then the statement technology 
is the art of constructing tools (by the way, this is 
also consistent with the definition given by M. 
Heidegger, 1954) implies several related conclu-
sions. This is only one of the ways of under-
standing the word technology, hence we should 
call it technology proper, in distinction to tech-
nological processes, or technological products, or 
socio-economic applications of technology. 
Technology creation is an art, hence it is learned 
mostly by doing, it is a highly intuitive activity: 
you can teach technology at an university, but 
being a technologist implies that you have per-
sonally constructed some tools, have actual ex-
perience in inventions and technology creation.  
It is aimed towards creating tools, called also 
technological artefacts or products of technology 
– misnamed by shortened expression technology 
in common language, what is often unfortunately 
repeated even in scientific texts. But intuitive, 
artistic creation of tools implies also that you 
cannot fully formalize this activity: no matter 
what quality control you apply in technological 
processes, a new tool might always be dangerous. 
Therefore, tools are tested rigorously, subjected 
to destructive tests. It is well known, e.g., in the 
case of cars; that the safety of their use must be 
checked by crash tests; but actually all tools are 
tested that way to some extent, e.g., laptop 
computers are tested by being dropped to the 
floor to check their reliability.  
On the other hand, every tool might be used 
inappropriately: even a perfectly constructed 
smith’s hammer might hurt the user, if she/he 
wants to apply it for fixing fine nails. Thus, any 
evaluation of safety of a technological product 
must take into account the character of its 
socio-economic application: even if engineers 
designing cars test them most rigorously, peo-
ple’s fascination with fast driving results in a 
number of deaths that exceeds many other causes. 
This distinction between the safety of a techno-
logical product used reasonably and the danger of 
social fascination with certain aspects of such 
products seems to be lost to some philosophers of 
technology. 
To summarize: testing technological knowl-
edge, embodied in tools as products of technol-
ogy, relies on direct applications, including 
destructive tests to check their safety and 
reliability; thus technology, as opposed to science, 
follows falsificationism in its everyday practice 
and is more pragmatic than paradigmatic; see 
also (A.P. Wierzbicki 2004), (A.P. Wierzbicki 
and Y. Nakamori 2007a) This distinction 
between technology and science is also 
overlooked by most philosophers of technology – 
and the concept of technoscience (B. Latour, 
1987) is thus a misnomer, even if there are 
obvious relations between hard science and 
technology.  As opposed to technologists, postmodern so-
ciologists of science ridicule falsificationism, 
saying that scientists never try to disprove, they 
want rather to confirm their theories; they do not 
even notice that tools are not theories and that 
they are usually falsified, and that their argu-
ments against objectivism (B. Latour, 1987) 
might be based on logical errors (the lack of un-
derstanding of temporal logic and feedback 
mechanism, where the same phenomenon can be 
counted both as a cause and effect, see final part 
of this paper). These controversies illustrate that 
the differences in the episteme of diverse cultural 
spheres are actually very big. 
Therefore, in (A.P. Wierzbicki and Y. Na-
kamori 2007a) we presented a proposal of a new 
integration of the episteme, much needed in the 
beginning era of knowledge civilization and 
called Constructive Evolutionary Objectivism. 
This integration is based on three principles: 
Evolutionary Falsification Principle (an exten-
sion of Popperian falsification towards an evolu-
tionary perspective of human development of 
knowledge in long term historical sense); and the 
two principles discussed in this paper: Multime-
dia Principle and Emergence Principle. We are 
aware that the contemporary differences between 
the episteme of the three cultural spheres - social 
sciences and humanities, hard and natural sci-
ences, and technology - are very great, thus the 
acceptance of such principles might take a long 
time. We are also aware that the principles we 
listed in the episteme might be modified during 
the adoption process. But we listed them pre-
cisely for that purpose, to present them as an 
object for discussion and possible falsification. 
The Emergence Principle stresses that new 
properties of a system emerge with increased 
levels of complexity, and these properties are 
qualitatively different than and irreducible to the 
properties of its parts. This might appear to be 
just a conclusion from the classical concepts of 
systems science, synergy and holism; or just a 
metaphysical religious belief. The point is that 
both such simplifying conclusions are mistaken. 
Synergy and holism say that a whole is greater 
than the sum of its parts, but do not stress irre-
ducibility. Thus, according to classical systemic 
reasoning, a whole is greater, but still explicable 
by and reducible to its parts. The best recent 
example of the phenomenon of emergence is the 
concept of software that emerged during last fifty 
years. Software cannot function without hard-
ware, but is irreducible to and cannot be ex-
plained by hardware. Thus, the Emergence Prin-
ciple is opposite to reductionism. It must be 
stressed that hard and natural sciences, more 
paradigmatic than technology, still believe in 
reductionism; for example, researchers in physics 
believe that quantum computing will essentially 
change computational science – while it will 
essentially change only hardware, whereas soft-
ware and its principles will remain practically 
unaffected. 
The Emergence Principle is not a metaphysi-
cal religious belief, because it can be justified 
rationally and scientifically – even if it might 
have, as we shall see, serious metaphysical 
consequences. The emergence of new concepts 
and properties at higher levels of complexity was 
noticed long ago in philosophy. A clear formula-
tion of the emergence principle, however, first 
evolved with the empirical evidence of the con-
cept of punctuated evolution in biology (see K. 
Lorentz, 1965), noted also by (K. Popper, 1972); 
then it was rationally reinforced by the concept of 
order emerging out of chaos (see E. Lorenz 1963, 
I. Prigogine and I. Stengers 1984, J. Gleick 1987). 
In parallel, it was pragmatically substantiated by 
technology, in hierarchical systems theory (e.g., 
W. Findeisen et al. 1980), as well as in the con-
cept of seven layers of telecommunication pro-
tocols (see, e.g., A.P. Wierzbicki and Y. Na-
kamori 2006). The last point is perhaps most 
telling: computer networks are the most complex 
technological systems today and we simply could 
not cope with their complexity if we did not 
separate their diverse functions into consecutive 
layers; the functions of the lowest, physical 
transmission layer are completely separated from 
higher layers, thus a change to optical or even 
quantum transmission does influence only the 
speed of communication and does not influence 
other functions of higher layers. 
Thus, the Reduction Principle of the industrial 
episteme – saying that the behaviour of a com-
plex system can be explained by the reduction to 
the behaviour of its parts – is valid only if the 
level of complexity of the system is rather low. 
Very complex technological systems today fol-
low the Emergence Principle. This is important 
for technology creation: a technologist cannot be 
successful today if (s)he sticks to the Reduction 
Principle without understanding the Emergence 
Principle. This also stresses again the distinction 
between hard science and technology – and 
shows that the acceptance of the Emergence 
Principle might be slow because it is conceptu-
ally challenging. 
The Emergence Principle, even if justified 
scientifically, rationally and pragmatically, might 
have, however, important metaphysical conse-
quences pertaining to the philosophy of the Ab-
solute, thus even religious metaphysical conse-
quences. We can ask the question: why we have 
been always interested in reasons, causes, finally 
asking questions about the Absolute or God as 
the ultimate reason or cause? One of possible 
answers is that we, humans, are accustomed to 
reasoning by reduction to causes, thus have to ask 
also about the ultimate cause. But what if reduc-
tion is not the only way of explanation, if emer-
gence is equally or even more important? Then 
even more important question is not about the 
ultimate cause, but about the ultimate effect, the 
goal of development. Thus, teleological reason-
ing and belief in God not as a creator, but the goal 
of all development – ideas that are certainly not 
new, but have been largely dismissed in recent 
times – are becoming justified in metaphysics of 
the Absolute when accepting the validity of the 
Emergence Principle. 
Finally, the Emergence Principle has also an 
important relation to the metaphysics of truth, 
namely the philosophy of mathematics and to the 
concept of truth in mathematics, see Z. Król 
(2007). Let us recall here some elements of the 
theory of truth in formal languages. According to 
K. Gödel (1931), the question of truth cannot be 
answered inside a given formal system; A. Tarski 
(1933) formalized this issue further, postulating 
the use of a formal metalanguage in order to 
meaningfully address the issue of truth in a given 
language. However, Z. Król (2005, 2007), fol-
lowing ideas of I. Lakatos (1976) stresses that it 
is impossible to create and study mathematics as 
a purely formal, meaningless game: there is no 
mathematical theory which is absolutely (i.e., 
actually) formalised, there is no mathematical 
theory given as a formal system with a formal 
metalanguage. To have a strictly formal language 
one needs a formal metalanguage, to have a 
formal metalanguage one needs a formal 
meta-metalanguage, and so on – an infinite re-
cursion. Thus, the only possible way is to stop 
and study fundamental assumptions in a 
non-formal, intuitive meta-environment. This 
intuitive environment is called hermeneutical 
horizon; Król shows that hermeneutical horizon 
has been changing historically, that “Euclidean 
geometry” has been understood differently (in the 
deepest interpretations of its axioms) by ancient 
Greeks, differently in times of Descartres, New-
ton, Kant, differently today. If this can be ob-
served in mathematics, it applies as well in other 
parts of science: different paradigms use not only 
different, incommensurable languages, but – 
more fundamentally - are also related to different 
hermeneutical horizons, intuitive environments 
of perceiving the truth of basic axioms. This 
phenomenon is called horizontal change. This 
change is not frequent in mathematics; it might 
be more frequent in other disciplines. 
However, even if historically changing, the 
perception of truth via hermeneutical horizon is 
not subjective, nor even intersubjective: we do 
not decide in social discourse what are the com-
ponents of a hermeneutical horizon (at least, not 
in mathematics, technology, and hard sciences; 
the situation in social sciences and humanities 
might be different). The formation of a herme-
neutical horizon is a process of a long term du-
ration; since, on one hand, the hermeneutical 
horizon is intuitive, on the other hand it is com-
mon, say, for all mathematicians working in a 
given age, then its formation must be uncon-
scious but related to the canon of teaching the 
given discipline – say, mathematics - in that age. 
Based on the concept of hermeneutical hori-
zon, we might turn back to the issue of basic 
explanations of development of science and 
technology. First we must select some basic as-
sumptions that could be accepted independently 
from a disciplinary perspective. We thus propose 
to assume that science and technology develops 
historically and the development has evolution-
ary character: knowledge about theories and 
ways of constructing tools is preserved in some 
domain that we shall call the intellectual heritage 
of humanity, but this knowledge also evolves 
historically, better theories and tools are con-
structed and they gradually – or fast in revolu-
tionary periods of punctuated evolution – replace 
the older ones. Here we already stipulate some 
basic concepts that actually belong to our her-
meneutical horizon: the domain of development – 
the intellectual heritage of humanity (called be-
fore the third world or world 3 in K. Popper, 
1972), including its emotive, intuitive and ra-
tional parts, see (A.P. Wierzbicki and Y. Na-
kamori, 2006); the concept of punctuated evolu-
tion, see (K. Lorentz, 1965), assuming that evo-
lutionary development is not necessarily smooth, 
it might consist of slow normal periods and fast 
revolutionary periods; finally and decisively, the 
concept of evolutionary fitness: if old theories 
and tools are replaced, there must be some way of 
deciding which ones should be replaced, which 
should be kept. 
Thus we must reflect: how human societies 
historically evaluated the fitness of theories and 
tools? We can start with a thought experiment: 
consider a group of people – say, an extended 
family, or a tribe - in early stages of the devel-
opment of human civilization. This development 
depended on three main factors:  
9 language and communication; 
9 tool making; 
9 human curiosity. 
Language was used as a tool of civilization 
evolution, but individual tool makers and think-
ers, motivated by human curiosity, might have 
developed theories and tools. They were 
prompted to present their theories to the group, 
even to beautify and defend their theories – 
which confirms the concept of a paradigm; 
however, when it came to tools, they had to 
demonstrate that the new tools actually worked. 
Creative thinkers presenting new theories might 
have been rewarded evolutionarily in the bio-
logical sense, since eloquence might be consid-
ered as a positive aspect of mating selection. 
However, discourse could not be decisive in 
proving the fitness of tools and theories – in the 
case of tools obviously experimental testing was 
needed, in the case of theories we have to con-
sider the evolutionary interest – in the civilization 
sense - of the tribe or the group that used the 
knowledge to enhance its success and survival 
capabilities. This evolutionary interest required 
long term falsification: personal theories and 
subjective truth that were too flowery must have 
been considered suspicious, finding ways to test 
them, even to falsify them, was necessary. Thus, 
Popperian falsificationism, Kuhnian paradigma-
tism and discursive intersubjectivism are three 
different sides of civilization evolution of hu-
manity, all of them are needed in adequate 
proportions.  
The question of adequate proportions in this 
thought experiment might help us to clarify the 
issue of objectivity versus power (or money), 
raised by postmodern sociology of science. The 
chieftain of such a tribe would be pragmatic and 
value knowledge that helped in her/his short term 
goals, increased her/his power; why should (s)he 
bother about objective knowledge? (S)He would, 
if (s)he cared about long term chances of survival 
of her/his tribe. We can apply here the axiom of 
uncertainty as used by J. Rawls in his theory of 
justice (Rawls 1971): in order to determine what 
principles we should consider just, we must 
imagine that we do not know in what conditions 
our children might find themselves and select 
such principles that would be most useful for 
them nevertheless. Note that the same axiom is 
also applicable to the issue what knowledge 
might be useful in the long term sense: if we do 
not know in which conditions our children or 
tribe might find themselves in the future, we 
value best well tested knowledge, as objective as 
possible. Thus, objectivity is similar to justice: 
absolute objectivity and absolute justice might be 
not attainable, but they are important ideals, 
values that cannot be reduced to power and 
money. 
Besides, the attempts of postmodern social 
sciences to reduce objectivity to power and 
money – see, e.g., B. Latour (1987) – are based 
on an incorrect use of more advanced forms of 
logic, similarly as many philosophical arguments 
about vicious circle. We know today what is 
feedback - a dependence of evolving 
time-streams of effects and causes in the dynamic 
sense – thus the argument of (B. Latour, 1987, p. 
99) against objectivity, “since the settlement of a 
controversy is the cause of Nature’s representa-
tion not the consequence, we can never use the 
outcome – Nature – to explain how and why a 
controversy has been settled” indicates a clear 
lack of understanding of the diachronic, dynamic 
feedback character of the causal loop in this case. 
On this example, we can also analyze the relation 
of intuitive or instinctive judgments and ration-
ality. It is difficult to experimentally verify 
knowledge in social sciences, hence they in-
stinctively (or rather intuitively, in their herme-
neutical horizon) prefer subjectivity or intersub-
jectivity to objectivity. Later they try to ration-
alize related conclusions – such as the reduction 
of objectivity to power and money. But the role 
and power of rationality is precisely to check 
such judgments for all logical consequences and 
for consistency (or, in this case, for the lack of 
consistency) with other parts of human knowl-
edge – with the rational heritage of humanity. 
We are prepared now to describe the relation 
of human knowledge to nature. First, we do not 
accept the hermeneutic horizontal assumption of 
B. Latour (quoted above) that “Nature” is only a 
construction of our minds and has only local 
character. Of course, the word nature refers both 
to the construction of our minds and to something 
more – to some persisting, universal (to some 
degree) aspects of the world surrounding us. 
People are not alone in the world; in addition to 
other people, there exists another part of reality, 
that of nature, although part of this reality has 
been converted by people to form human-made, 
mostly technological systems. There are parts of 
reality that are local and multiple, there are parts 
that are universal. To some of our colleagues who 
believe that there is no universe, only a mul-
ti-verse, we propose the following hard wall test: 
we position ourselves against a hard wall, close 
our eyes and try to convince ourselves that there 
is no hard wall before us. If we do not succeed in 
convincing ourselves, it means that there is no 
multi-verse, because nature apparently has some 
universal aspects. If we succeed in convincing 
ourselves, we can try to verify or falsify this 
conviction by running ahead with closed eyes. 
Second, the general relation of human 
knowledge to reality might be described as fol-
lows. People, motivated by curiosity and aided by 
intuition and emotions, observe reality and for-
mulate hypotheses about properties of nature, of 
other people, of human relations; they also con-
struct tools that help them to deal with nature 
(such as cars) or with other people (such as 
telephones); together, we call all this knowledge. 
As formulated by W.V. Quine (Quine 1953), “the 
totality of our knowledge is a man-made fabric 
which touches experience only along its edges”; 
but knowledge cannot be useful without at least 
touching experience. Thus, people test and 
evaluate the knowledge constructed by them by 
applying it to reality: perform destructive tests of 
tools, devise critical empirical tests of theories 
concerning nature, apply and evaluate theories 
concerning social and economic relations.  
Such a process can be represented as a general 
spiral of evolutionary knowledge creation, see 
Fig. 2. We observe reality (either in nature or in 
society) and its changes, compare our observa-
tions with human heritage in knowledge (the 
transition Observation). Then our intuitive and 
emotive knowledge helps us to generate new 
hypotheses (Enlightenment) or to create new 
tools; we apply them to existing reality (Appli-
cation), usually with the goal of achieving some 
changes, modifications of reality (Modification); 
we observe them again.  
It is important, however, to note that many 
other transitions enhance this spiral. First is the 
natural evolution in time: modified reality be-
comes existing reality through Recourse. Second 
is the evolutionary selection of tested knowledge: 
most new knowledge might be somehow re-
corded, but only the positively tested knowledge, 
resilient to falsification attempts, remains an 
important part of human heritage (Evaluation). 
Naturally, there might be also other transitions 
between the nodes indicated in the spiral model, 
but the transitions indicated in Fig. 2 are the most 
essential ones. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 The general OEAM Spiral of evolutionary Knowledge creation 
 
Thus, nature is not only the effect of con-
struction of knowledge by people, nor is it only 
the cause of knowledge: it is both cause and ef-
fect in a positive feedback loop, where more 
knowledge results in more modifications of na-
ture and more modifications result in more 
knowledge. As in most positive feedback loops, 
the overall result is an avalanche-like growth; and 
this avalanche-like growth, if unchecked, beside 
tremendous opportunities creates also diverse 
dangers, usually not immediately perceived but 
lurking in the future. Thus, the importance of 
selecting knowledge that is as objective as pos-
sible relates also to the fact that avalanche-like 
growth creates diverse threats: we must leave to 
our children best possible knowledge in order to 
prepare them for dealing with unknown future. 
This description of a spiral-like, evolutionary 
character of knowledge creation, see also 
(Wierzbicki and Nakamori 2007b), is consistent 
with our technological hermeneutical horizon 
and enhances Constructive Evolutionary Objec-
tivism. It is also novel in the sense that even the 
best recent monograph concerning evolutionary 
development of scientific knowledge by (Jensen 
et al. 2003) or the insightful analysis of knowl-
edge societies in (Stehr 1994) do not present this 
issue in terms of a spiral-like feedback loop; 
moreover, they follow rather economic than 
technological hermeneutical horizon, e.g., with-
out distinguishing technology proper from its 
socio-economic applications. 
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